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[The following is the recent federal statute on the subject:
An Act Relating to the maintenance of actions for death on the high seas and
other navigable waters.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of A-imerica in Congress assembled, That whenever the death of a person shall be
caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a
marine league from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or'the
Territories or dependencies of the United States, the personal representative of
the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the United
States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband,
parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or corporation which
would have been liable if death had not ensued.
SEC. 2. That the recovery in such suit shall be a fair and just compensation for
the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought
and shall be apportioned among them by the court in proportion to the loss they
may severally have suffered by reason of the death of the person by whose repre-
sentative the suit is brought.
SEc. 3. That such suit shall be begun within two years from the date of such
wrongful act, neglect, or default, unless during that period there has not been
reasonable opportunity for securing jurisdiction of the vessel, person, or corpora-
tion sought to be charged; but after the expiration of such period of two years the
right of action hereby given shall not be deemed to have lapsed until ninety days
after a reasonable opportunity to secure jurisdiction has offered.
SEC. 4. That whenever a right of action is granted by the law of any foreign
State on account of death by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring upon the
high seas, such right may be maintained in an appropriate action in admiralty in the
courts of the United States without abatement in respect to the amount for which
recovery is authorized, any statute of the United States to the contrary notwith-
standing.
SEC. 5. That if a person die as the result of such wrongful act, neglect, or
default as is mentioned in section i during the pendency in a court of admiralty of
the United States of a suit to recover damages for personal injuries in respect of
such act, neglect, or default, the personal representative of the decedent may be
substituted as a party and the suit may proceed as a suit under this Act for the
recovery of the compensation provided in section 2.
SEC. 6. That in suits under this Act the fact that the decedent has been guilty
of contributory negligence shall not bar recovery, but the court shall take into




SEC. 7. That the provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of
action or remedies for death shall not be affected by this Act. Nor shall this Act
apply to the Great Lakes or to any waters within the territorial limits of any
State, or to any navigable waters in the Panama Canal Zone.
SiEc. 8. That this Act shall not affect any pending suit, action, or proceeding.
Approved, March 30, 1920.
(Public Acts, No. 165-66th Congress. S. 2085)].
As the writer has been in touch with the efforts to secure this legis-
lation from their inception, having been a member of committees both
of the Maritime Law Association and of the American Bar Association,
he has had exceptional advantages for knowing the lines along which
this statute has been evolved. In fact, in its final form much of it was
drawn by him.
• Prior to I886 there was much conflict of decision on the question
whether, in the absence of any statute, there was a right of action in the
admiralty for damages resulting in death. In the view of some judges,
the doctrine that such a cause dies with the person was treated as lim-
ited to the common law, and the attempt was made to work out a right of
action for the admiralty court from the civil law and from principles of
natural justice. But in I886 the Supreme Court decided in The Har-
risburg1 that there was no difference between the common-law and
civil-law doctrines on the subject, and that there was no such right of
action in the admiralty in the absence of statute.
This left open the question whether such a right of action could be
created by statute. As far back as 1872, in American S. B. Co. v.
Chase,2 the power of a state to give such a right of action on the com-
mon-law side in cases arising within its own boundaries, though on
navigable waters included therein, was recognized, and; in Sherlock v.
Alling,3 decided in 1876, this right was upheld as to causes of action
arising on navigable waters within the boundaries of a state, though the
vessels affected were engaged in interstate commerce. It was added,
however, that this was true only as long as Congress forbore to act.
But the Supreme Court has never held directly and unequivocally
that a state statute can give such a right enforceable in an admiralty
court, though it has recognized such rights in limited liability pro-
ceedings and in at least one dictum.' On the other hand, the inferior
federal courts have enforced such rights of action under state statutes,
and have held that they had jurisdiction on the admiralty side, on the
theory that such causes of action are torts maritime by nature when
occurring on navigable waters, and therefore within the jurisdiction of
(1886) 119 U. S. 199, 7 Sup. Ct. 140.
(1872, U. S.) 16 Wall. 522.
(1876) 93 U. S. 99.
'Butler v. S. S. Co. (1889) 13o U. S. 527, 9 Sup. Ct 612; The Corsair (1892)
145 U. S. 335, 12 Sup. Ct 949; The Hamilton (907) 2o7 U. S. 698, 28 Sup. Ct
133.
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an admiralty court regardless of their source. This left the jurisdic-
tion in such cases dependent on local statutes necessarily limited in their
operation, so that for cases arising outside of the jurisdiction of a
state there was no remedy.
In 1899 the Maritime Law Association was organized, and was com-
posed of specialists in admiralty law and experts in average adjust-
ment and marine insurance. One of its earliest activities was the
appointment of a committee to draft and recommend to the Association
a congressional statute giving a right of action in the admiralty for such
cases. In 19oo Congressman Boutell of Illinois introduced a bill
designed to accomplish the purpose, but it was imperfect in many par-
ticulars, and was afterwards withdrawn. From that time until Novem-
ber, 1903, committees of the Maritime Law Association devoted much
time and thought to the preparation of a satisfactory bill. There was
no difference of opinion as to the need of legislation, but there were
many puzzling questions as to the waters and vessels to which such a
bill should be made applicable. The main issue was, whether to make
such an act apply to all navigable waters, and thus supersede state
statutes within their respective boundaries, or to make it supplementary
to state statutes and apply only on waters not covered by any statute.
Those advocating a statute applying to all navigable waters urged the
advantage of uniformity, and the endless diversity of the state statutes.
Those advocating an act covering only waters not included within the
range of the state statutes pointed out the unfavorable public sehtiment
that might be engendered by having two different statutes covering the
same subject and operating in neighboring fields between which it is
often difficult to locate a boundary. After much deliberation, the uni-
formity 'view prevailed, and at the November, 1903, meeting of the
Association a draft of an act was agreed upon and recommended for
passage. It was offered in Congress, but no action upon it could be
secured.
At the November, 19o8, meeting of the Association this same draft of
*the bill was again indorsed, and the committee directed to renew their
efforts to secure its passage. It was reintroduced in the House by
Mr. Parker, and in the Senate by Senator Lodge.
5 Hearings were
had before the Senate and House committees on February ioth and
March 3 Ist, 191o, at which representatives of the Association presented
their views. No action however was taken by Congress, mainly on
account of press of other business.
The Titanic disaster in April, 1912, focused the attention of the
.public on the need of some legislation, so that at the meeting of the
Association on May 3, 1912, it was decided to make renewed efforts for
such legislation; and the draft of the Act was revised to meet objec-
I H. R. 158IO, Senate Bill, 6291, 6ist Congress.
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tions that had been urged against it. It was offered in the House by
Mr. Peters, and in the Senate by Senator Brandegee.6 On the failure
of that Congress to act, the bill, in substantially the same form, was
introduced in the House by Mr. Peters.7
Meanwhile the American Bar Association had lent its powerful sup-
port to the measure and appointed a committee whose chairman,
Mr. George Whitelock, interested himself with his accustomed energy.
'This bill passed the House on January 6, 1915i but unfortunately
amendments were added on the floor which made it susceptible to the
construction that a recovery could be had both under state and federal
statutes for the same accident, and which also attached to it an amend-
ment as to limited liability apparently affecting the then pending Titanic
litigation.
Up to this point all drafts of bills had proceeded on the theory of
having a uniform law for all navigable waters of the United States,
whether within the boundaries of a state or not. The discussions on
the bill had shown that this provoked opposition, as local practitioners
were satisfied with their own local statutes, and did not want them
superseded. Hence, at the May, 1915, meeting of the Maritime Law
Association, it was decided to take the other course and draft a bill
intended to be supplementary to the local statutes and applicable to
waters which they did not reach. The result was the bill offered in the
House by Governor Montague of Virginia, and in the Senate by
Senator Lodge.8 This bill finally passed and was approved March 30,
192o, the only material change being the addition of section 4.
This section was apparently added for the purpose of giving our
courts the power to enforce such a right of action arising under a f or-
eign law against a foreign vessel. The addition was superfluous, for
it is an elementary doctrine of marine law that an admiralty claim
against a ship can be enforced against her wherever she may be found.
"It has force everywhere, and follows a ship around the globe with
lengthening chain into every port known to commerce which she may
enter."9
In The Bourgogne,'9 our courts recognized and enforced a death
claim arising under a French law against a French vessel.
A review of the Act first involves consideration of the waters on
which it was intended to operate. The above account of its evolution,
coupled with the language of the first and seventh sections, shows that
it was specially guarded in terms, so as to leave state statutes unaffected
'H. R. 24764, Senate Bill, 693o, 62d Congress.
I H. R. 6143, 63d Congress.
H. R. 99g9, Senate Bill, 4288, 64th Congress.
'The Sydney L. Wright (1883, E. D. Va.) 5 Hughes, 474.
10 (igo8) 21o U. S. 95, 28 Sup. Ct. 664.
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by it. Hence it covers only waters a marine league from the shore of
a state, or waters within regions where the federal government has
exclusive jurisdiction.
This principle involved the exclusion of the Great Lakes. The
boundary between this country and Canada is the middle of the Lakes,
so that waters on our side of that line are necessarily within the juris-
diction of some state, and waters on the other side are necessarily within
the jurisdiction of Canada.
The Association draft included the waters of the Panama Canal Zone.
But on February 26, 1916, the acting Secretary of War wrote to the
Speaker of the House inclosing a letter from the acting Governor of
the Canal which asked that the canal be exempted, saying:
"The present laws of the Canal Zone extend. over the navigable
waters of the zone as well as over the land. If this bill were made
extensive to the navigable waters of the Panama Canal, it would result
in the application of different principles of substantive law for cases
arising on board of ships in the navigable waters of the zone from
those applying to cases arising on land in the Canal Zone."
Accordingly the clause was added to the seventh section which
excluded the waters of the Canal Zone.
If the Governor meant by the above quotation that such a right of
action already existed in the Zone, he assumed what is not free from
doubt.11
It is next important to consider whether the Act is a survival act or
a death act. Statutes on the subject usually follow one of two theories.
Some give a right of action to the injured party himself, and make that
cause of action survive. The Massachusetts 12 and Louisiana' 3 Acts
are good examples of this class, and they.are termed "survival acts."
Others give an entirely new right of action to the relatives or other
parties injured by the death on account of their loss from the death, and
not on account of any right of action in the deceased himself made to
survive for their benefit. Lord Campbells Act' in England and the
Virginia Statute'5 are examples of this latter class. The Federal
Employer's Liability Act,' 6 prior to the amendment of April 5, 1910,
was also an example of this latter class. By that amendment this Act
was made a hybrid act giving a right of action to the deceased which
was made to survive, and also a right of action to certain relatives.'
7
" Lebert v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co. (1918, C. C. A. .th) 249 Fed. 349.
"Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act (2d ed. 1913) 515, quoting Rev. Laws, 19o2,
ch. IM1.
"Rev. Civ. Code, i9og, see. 2315.
" (1846) 9 & 1O Vict. c. 93.
"'Va. Code, i9ig, ch. 236, sec. 5786.
"Act of June ii, i9o6 (34 Stat at L. 232).
S(9,5) 237 U. S. 648, 35 Sup. Ct 704.
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The difference between the two classes is well explained by Mr. Justice
Lurton in Michigan Central Ry. v. Vreeland.'8
The rationale of these decisions makes the act a death act, not a
survival act.
This distinction is important in passing upon cases which overlap the
border line. Suppose that a party is fatally injured while on the high
seas, but dies after reaching state waters. The Statute makes the place
of the wrongful act the test, and would, therefore, govern if the death
occurred on navigable waters, though within the marine league. Dif-
ferent and more difficult questions arise if the injury was on the high
seas but the death occurred ashore. It is a settled doctrine that a cause
of action in tort is entirely without the jurisdiction of the admiralty if
it was consummate on land, though it originated on navigable waters.
The grant of admiralty jurisdiction is by the Constitution. Congress
can regulate admiralty matters if they are admiralty matters; but it can
not make a matter marine if not so by nature, and hence can not give a
remedy in admiralty for a matter which is not marine by nature. True,
it may make many regulations under the commerce clause, but even that
clause does not confer the right to give an admiralty remedy for a cause
of action not marine by nature. As far back as 1851, in The Genesee
Chief,19 the court said:
"Nor can the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States be made
to depend on regulations of commerce. They are entirely distinct
things, having no necessary connection with one another, and are con-
ferred in the Constitution by separate and distinct grants ..... .The
judicial power in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction has
never been supposed to extend to contracts made on land and to be
executed on land. But if the power of regulating commerce can be
made the foundation of jurisdiction in its courts, and a new and
extended admiralty jurisdiction beyond its heretofore known and
admitted limits may be created on water under that authority, the same
reason would justify the same exercise of power on land."
Under a death act the cause of action is to the survivors, and is
not consummate till death. Hence, if the death was ashore, it was not
within the admiralty jurisdiction, and neither the state nor Congress
can make it so. Therefore, such a case would be governed by the
state statute on the common-law side.
The state statute should also govern as to injuries received within
the marine league, though death should occur beyond it; for the Act
in terms applies only beyond the league, and remedies under state
statutes are expressly reserved by the seventh section.
We must next determine the vessels to which the Act applies. Here
.the most puzzling problems connected with the subject are destined to
arise. We will omit any discussion of its bearing upon the territories
or dependencies as of comparatively lesser importance, and confine it to
18 (IM13) 227 U. S. 59, 33 Sup. Ct. 192.
19 (i85r, U. S.) 12 How. 443, 452-3.
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causes of action arising upon the high seas. And we shall reserve the
question of the rights of seamen against their own vessel for separate
discussibn.
Take the case of a collision between an American and a foreign ship,
in which both ships are at fault, and on both of which deaths are the
result. As to those on the American ship, the right of action is clear
against their own ship. Before there was any congressional statute,
it had been held that a state could follow its citizens and property upon
the high seas and subject them to its laws on the subject.20 Is it not
equally clear that the Act gives a right of action against the American
ship to the representatives of those killed on the foreign ship? The
right of Congress so to legislate as to a ship under its own flag can not
be questioned. The sole question, then, is one of construction.
The prototype of all these statutes is Lord Campbell's Act,
21 or, as
the English call it, the "Fatal Accidents Act." In Davidsson v. Hill
22
a collision occurred on the high seas between an English and a Nor-
wegian vessel, in which the Englishman was solely in fault, and one of
the crew of the Norwegian ship was drowned. The discussion was,
whether the English Act was intended to apply to foreigners as against
an English ship-owner. Separate opinions were rendered by Sir
William Kennedy and Sir Walter Phillimore, holding that the Act
must have been so intended.
State courts, in the vast majority of instances, have construed their
statutes in the same way.2 3 As our Act follows Lord Campbell's
Act substantially, it is practically certain that it will receive a like
construction.
Now, in the case supposed, what are the rights of the Americans
against the foreign ship? In the writer's opinion, their rights depend on
the law of the flag of the foreign ship, under the principle of Davidsson
v. Hill, supra. An act of Congress can hardly be held to affect the con-
duct of foreign ships on the high seas. In The Sagamore,21 in which
there was a collision between a British steamer and a Massachusetts
ship on the high seas, resulting in the death of some of the crew on
the IlMassadhusetts ship, and in which the Britisher was at fault, it was
attempted to hold the Britisher under the Massachusetts act, on the
theory that, when the Massachusetts ship was struck, a tort was com-
mitted on Massachusetts soil. This contention was negatived, the court
saying:25
"While the statute offers a liability of Massachusetts owners to those
injured, it does not follow that it may impose a liability upon citizens of
another state who are without its territorial jurisdiction. Its authority
The Hamilton (1907) 207 U. S. 398, 28 Sup. Ct. 133.
t' See note 14 supra.
[i9ol] 2 K. B. 6o6.
Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act (2d ed. 1913) sec. 86.
24 (1917, C. C. A. Ist) 247 Fed. 743. See also The Hamilton, supra note 20.
"The Sagamore, supra, at page 757.
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over its own ships and citizens does-not extend to the ships and citizens
of another nation."
Congress evidently realized this, for the fourth section, while super-
fluous, recognized that such cases would be governed by the foreign
flag.
The doctrine of The Scotland26 is not in conflict with this view.
That and similar cases rherely hold that, when a foreigner voluntarily
resorts to our courts to claim the benefit of the protection accorded by
our law, he is subject to the terms of that law. Hence our limited lia-
bility act was applied to a foreigner who filed a petition for a limita-
tion of liability. The additional ground was assigned that the law of
limited liability is a part of the general maritime law which any mari-
time nation may adopt in whole or in part as it sees fit.
This reasoning can not apply to the case of a foreigner brought into
our courts in invitum, nor can the death statutes be considered a part
of the general maritime law.
How about a collision between two foreigners on the high seas,
resulting in death due to negligence? Though suit were brought in
one of our courts, our act could not apply, but the law of the respective
flags would govern the liability of each ship. The BourgogneV is an
interesting application of this. There our court applied the interna-
tional rules of navigation as construed by it (for collision has often
been held to be comnounis uris and a part of general maritime law),
but it applied the law of the ship's flag in passing upon the right to
recover damages for the death.
It remains to define the rights of action growing out of the death
of a seaman on navigable waters.
Where more than one ship is involved, the right of a seaman's repre-
sentatives against the other ship is the same as that of any one else, so
no time need be wasted on that phase of it.28
Passing then to the seaman's own ship, it will be simpler to discuss
the situation prior to June 5, 192 o, as applicable to American privately-
owned ships. And, under this subdivision, let us first consider the
situation inside the marine league, which is expressly excluded from the
range of the Congressional Act.
Before any statutes on the subject, the right of a seaman against his
own ship, independent of any injury growing out of unseaworthiness,
was simply for maintenance and cure, and did not extend beyond his
life. And this was a right not affected by any question of negligence.
Hence there was no remedy within the marine league unless a state
statute could and did confer it. Until 1917 it was supposed that, in the
absence of congressional legislation, state statutes could create such a
(1881) o5 U. S. 24.
(i9o8) :2o U. S. 95, 28 Sup. Ct 664.
2 The Hamilton, supra note 20.
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right in cases arising within their jurisdiction, and that a right so
arising, being marine by nature, could be enforced in an admiralty
court. But in 1917 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen2Q was decided. It
went up on writ of error to review the action of the New York Court of
Appeals sustaining an allowance under the New York Workmen's
Compensation Act to the representatives of a longshoreman killed while
at work on a ship on navigable waters. The Court held that such work
was maritime in its nature and beyond the reach of state legislation,
saying3 :
"And plainly, we think, no such legislation is valid if it contravenes
the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress, or works mate-
rial prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law,
or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its
international and interstate relations."
A year later Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co.$- was decided. It was
a common-law suit for personal injuries received by a seaman at sea.
The court held that, even in a state common-law court, the maintenance
and cure doctrine of the admiralty governed the seaman's, measure of
recovery, that a state statute could not modify it, and that the saving of
a common-law remedy by the Judiciary Act 2 did not enlarge the scope
of such a statute.
U.ence, although the right of a state to legislate in ordinary death
cases was recognized, it is a necessary logical deduction from these
cases that such power does not exist in the exceptional case of seamen,
and that the ancient admiralty doctrine applicable to them is beyond the
reach of state legislation.
Nor is this conclusion shaken by the provision in the seventh section
of the Congressional Act, that "the provisions of any state statute
giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be
affected by this Act." That is a mere saving clause, and does not give
the statutes any effect that they did not have regardless of it. In
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart33 the court passed upon the Congres-
sional Act of October 6, 1917,34 which was intended to amend the
Judicial Code "so as to save to claimants the rights and remedies under
the workmen's compensation laws of any state." The court said
35 :
"The usual function of a saving clause is to preserve something from
immediate interference-not to create; and the rule is that expression
by the Legislature of an erroneous opinion concerning the law does not
alter it."
" (1917) 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct 524.
"Ibid. at p. 216, 37 Sup. Ct at p. 529.
(,9,8) 247 U. S. 372, 38 Sup. Ct 501.
"Act of Sept. 24, 1789 (1 Stat at L. 73, 76).
(1920) 253 U. S. 149, 40 Sup. Ct 438.
"Act of Oct 6, 1917 (40 Stat at L. 395).
"Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, supra note 33, at p. 162, 40 Sup. Ct at p.
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It was also decided that, while Congress could modify the maritime
law, it could not delegate the power to state legislatures. The case was
that of a bargeman killed on navigable waters within the State of New
York.
And so it follows that, as to a seaman, there was, before June 5, 1920,
no right of action for a death within the marine league. This was the
result of the unwillingness to pass an act applicable to all navigable
waters, instead of an act applicable only beyond the marine league.
Next, as to deaths beyond the marine league in the case of seamen,
the very decisions reviewed above concede the right of Congressional
legislation. The act in its terms is broad enough to include seamen,
and it would give a right of action in such cases.
Now as to the situation subsequent to June 5, 1920. On that day the
Merchant Marine Act86 took effect, the 3 3d section whereof provided:
"That section 20 of such Act of March 4, 1915, be, and is, amended to
read as follows:
'Sec. 2o. That any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the
course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for
damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all
statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law
right or remedy in case of personal injury to railway employees shall
apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such
personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may main-
tain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in
such action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating
the right of action f or death in the case of railway employees shall be
applicable. Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the
district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his princi-
pal office is located.'"
This act applies to all navigable waters. As it adopts the theory of
the Federal Employer's Liability Act, the presumption is that it will
follow the construction put upon that Act. And the Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that that Act supersedes state statutes.
3 7
Hence it results that, as to rights of action arising out of the death of
seamen though in state waters, the above-quoted section of, the Mer-
chant Marine Act controls, and displaces state statutes.
In the writer's opinion, it also displaces the Act of March 30, 1920,
now under discussion, in so far as rights of action for the death of
seamen are concerned. It is a later act applicable to a special class,
and to that extent modifies the earlier act of general application.
Assuming the correctness of this view, what rights does this later act
confer?
The natural construction of the act is that, in suits by the seaman
himself for personal injuries, he has an election to sue in the admiralty
Act of June 5, 1920, Public Acts, No. 24i-66th Cong. H. R. 9392.6 7Mich. Cent. Ry. v. Vreeland (1913) 227 U. S. 59, 33 Sup. Ct 192.
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for the damages which he could have recovered in that forum, or to
bring a common-law action for such damages as he could recover under
the principles of the Employer's Liability Act. There was a reason for
an election in this case, for it preserved to the seaman his rights under
the maintenance and cure doctrine even in those cases where he was
negligent and the ship-owner was not.
On the other hand, the last half of the section relating to death
actions does not give an election; for there was no remedy in admir-
alty to preserve under the maintenance and cure doctrine. And we
can hardly attribute to Congress an intent to preserve a concurrent
remedy under the Death Statute without more specific language.
If it did so intend, we have the anomaly of this section of the
Merchant Marine Act applying different rules within the marine
league and without it, and the further anomaly of allowing two differ-
ent suits in different courts with different methods of recovery for the
same tort. This is manifest by a comparison of section one of the
Employer's Liability Act with the corresponding section of the death
act. In the former the consort and children are the sole beneficiaries
in the first instance. The parents can recover only when there are no
such prior beneficiaries, and the dependent next of kin can only recover
in the absence of both prior classes. But in the death statute of March
30, 192o, they are all named along together, and the recovery is appor-
tioned according to the loss they have severally suffered.
Hence there was a good reason for refusing an election in this case,
for Congress can not be supposed to have been guilty of the injustice
of allowing a recovery in favor of the surviving consort or child in a
common-law action under the amended section 33 of the Merchant
Marine Act, and also a recovery in admiralty in favor of some
dependent relative under the Death Statute of March 30, 192o. As the
beneficiaries under the two statutes are different, there would be no
way of enforcing an election between them. The two statutes can not
be made to dove-tail in this special case, and the later, applying to the
special case, must replace the other. Two bodies can not occupy the
same space at the same time. And so we are driven to the conclusion
that the only remedy in case of the death of a seaman on navigable
waters is a common-law action in the court of the district in which the
defendant employer resides, or in which his principal office is located.
So far the discussion as to the rights springing from the death of a
seaman on navigable waters has had in view simply the rights of seamen
or their representatives on vessels of private American owners. But
there is one other class of unfortunates who deserve passing though
regretful mention. They are seamen of American vessels operated for
business purposes by the American Government. We must not forget
the United States Shipping Board of happy memory.
Everybody knows that the Government can not be sued except by its
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consent, and subject to the conditions under which that consent is given.
The only act purporting to give consent as to such vessels is the Act
of March 9, 1920.3" Its second section gives the right to sue the United
States only "in cases where if such vessel were privately owned or
operated ..... .a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained at the
time of the commencement of the action herein provided for." But
we have already seen that the only remedy in case of a seaman's death
is a common-law suit against the private owner, assimilated to the
Employer's Liability Act. Hence this remedy is not within the lan-
guage of the Act of March 9, I92o.
On the other hand it is clear that the above quoted 3 3 d section of the
Merchant Marine Act does not proprio vigore give any remedy against
government-owned ships; for the Goverment can not be said to reside
anywhere, or to have a principal office located anywhere.
And so the Shipping Board seems entitled to kill its seamen with
impunity.
And, finally, as to foreign seamen. On the high seas as against their
own ships, the right of action for a death is governed by the law of the
ship's flag, which will be given effect, not only under the general prac-
tice of the admiralty, but under the express provisions of section 4 of
our act. On the high seas, as against an American vessel colliding with
their vessel and causing death, the right would be given under our death
statute of March 3o , 1920, under the doctrine of Davidsson v. Hill.
9
In American waters within the marine league, the right of action would
be regulated by the local state statute, for the 3 3d section of the Mer-
chant Marine Act can not be construed to apply to seamen on foreign
ships; and therefore the state statutes remain in force.
Attention should be given to the difference between the Death Act
of March 30, 192o, and most similar acts in the provision as to the
limitation. The third section makes the time run from the date of the
wrongful act, while it is usually made to run from the death. The
fifth section allows the revival of an action for the personal injury if
death as the result of such injury ensued during the pendency of such
suit; and so the method adopted makes the limitation in personal injury
and death suits run in the same way, and enables a badly injured person
to preserve his rights by suit during his life. Besides, it is a fairer
provision. The date of the wrongful act is within the equal knowledge
of both parties; while the date of the death may not be. The cause of
death may be obscure, and put the opposite party, after the lapse of
years and consequent loss of testimony, at the mercy of hired experts.
From every view-point the rule of the new act is the most equitable.
'Public Acts, No. i56-66th Cong. S. 3o76, or see Hughes, Admiralty (2d ed.,
I92o) Appx. 5o6.
' [19O1] 2 K. B. 6o6.
